![]() Mountbatten’s tactics included urging the Maharaja to refrain from making a decision until the situation was a little clearer, and to err on the side of caution and sign Standstill Agreements with both India and Pakistan. He would later say that his sole motive in Kashmir had always been to persuade Hari Singh that it was his choice that would determine the future of Kashmir. ![]() Kashmir, wrote Nehru was, “of the first importance to India as a whole, not only because of the past year’s occurrences there, which have drawn attention to it, but also because of the great strategic importance of that frontier state.” Just what Mountbatten felt on the issue, nobody will ever know, given the former Viceroy’s gift of the garble. The note made a strong case for Sheikh Abdullah’s popularity in Kashmir and Prime Minister Kak’s corruption, which had over the months, isolated and terrified the Maharaja. The second letter-which is not mentioned by VP, but which most certainly was received by the Viceroy-was a long and elaborate note by Nehru. The gist of his screed appeared to be that British policy was now shifting focus to Pakistan, which (via the accession of Kashmir) could be developed as an eastern frontier of a British sphere of influence in the Middle East. One was a confused and rambling note from Krishna Menon, who insisted that Jammu and Kashmir had to be part of Indian territory. ![]() What Mountbatten actually said has never been made fully clear, but before the Viceroy departed from Delhi, he was the recipient of two letters. ![]()
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